Supreme Court Judgements
State of Kerala vs Thomas
The Kerala High Court ruled on the dispute regarding property and state regulations. The judgement clarified state-level powers and legal procedures applicable within Kerala.
Union of India Intervention
The Union of India intervened to provide guidance on federal implications and the application of central laws, ensuring alignment with constitutional provisions.
BALRAM SINGH vs UNION OF INDIA W.P.(C) No. 645/2020
Question(s): Is the insertion of the words ‘socialist’ and ‘secular’ in the Preamble to the Constitution during the emergency period by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 constitutionally valid?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: A Division Bench (two judges) of the Supreme Court dismissed the writ petitions by holding that the constitutional position regarding the secular and socialist nature of the Constitution remains unambiguous due to earlier interpretations of these words by the Supreme Court. The order of the Court was rendered by a bench of CJI Khanna and Justice Kumar.
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY THROUGH ITS REGISTRAR FAIZAN MUSTAFA vs NARESH AGARWAL C.A. No. 2286/2006
Question(s): (i) When does an educational institution qualify as a minority institution entitled to the protections under Article 30 of the Constitution? (ii) Whether the Supreme Court’s judgment in S. Azeez Basha v. Union of India (“Azeez Basha”) (1967 INSC 238), which held that Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) is not a minority institution is correct.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court by a 4-3 majority overruled Azeez Basha. The majority held that merely because an institute is created by a statute does not strip it of minority status. The majority also held that Article 30(1) protects institutes established before the Constitution came into force in 1950. The Court laid down criteria to determine when an institution is a minority institution benefitting from Article 30(1) protection. The majority judgment was authored by Chief Justice Chandrachud. Justices Kant, Datta and Sharma authored separate (partly dissenting) opinions.
CENTRAL ORGANISATION FOR RAILWAY ELECTRIFICATION vs M/S ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV) A JOINT VENTURE COMPANY C.A. No. 9486-9487/2019
Question(s): (i) Whether a person ineligible to be an arbitrator under the seventh schedule of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”) can mandate the other party choose an arbitrator from the panel of arbitrators curated by them. (ii) Whether the principle of equal treatment of parties applies when appointing arbitrators. (iii) Whether the unilateral appointment of arbitrators by the government entity in a public-private contract violates Article 14 of the Constitution.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Constitution bench (five judges) of the Supreme Court by a 3:2 majority held that clauses in arbitration agreements allowing one party to appoint sole arbitrators unilaterally are impermissible. While public sector undertakings (“PSU”)are not prohibited from empanelling potential arbitrators, requiring the other party to select from the curated panel violated the principle of equality of parties. The Court held that the equal treatment of parties applies at all stages of arbitration, including the appointment of arbitrators. The majority opinion was authored by Chief Justice Chandrachud on behalf of himself and Justices Misra and Pardiwala. Justice Roy and Justice Narasimha wrote separate partially dissenting opinions. Justice Roy held that unilateral appointments are not inherently invalid, as long as they do not fall within those prohibited by the Seventh Schedule. Justice Narasimha held that courts should determine whether a specific unilateral appointment of an arbitrator warrants prohibition.
TEJ PRAKASH PATHAK vs RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT C.A. No. 2634/2013
Question(s): Whether the “rules of the game” governing a recruitment process can be changed after the recruitment process has commenced.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Constitution Bench (five judges) of the Supreme Court unanimously held that the existing Rules governing eligibility criteria cannot be changed once recruitment begins unless the existing Rules permit it. However, recruitment bodies can devise appropriate procedures or methods of selection during the recruitment process as long as they are transparent, non-discriminatory, and rational. The Court upheld the decision in K. Manjusree. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Misra.
M/S. BAJAJ ALLIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE CO.LTD. vs RAMBHA DEVI C.A. No. 841/2018
Question(s): Whether a person holding a license for a “Light Motor Vehicle” (“LMV”) can drive a “Transport Vehicle” weighing less than 7,500 kgs without a specific endorsement on their license.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Constitution Bench (five judges) unanimously upheld the correctness of the law laid down in Mukund Dewangan and decided that a person holding an LMV license was entitled to drive a transport vehicle weighing less than 7,500 kgs without any additional endorsement on their license. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Roy.
ANJUM KADARI vs UNION OF INDIA SLP(C) No. 8541/2024
Question(s): Whether the Uttar Pradesh Board of Madarsa Education Act, 2004 (“Madarsa Act") is constitutional?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: A Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and upheld the constitutional validity of the Madarsa Act except the provisions which provided for the regulation of higher education degrees. These provisions were found to conflict with the UGC Act. The judgment of the Court was authored by Chief Justice Chandrachud.
PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION vs STATE OF MAHARASHTRA . C.A. No. 1012/2002
Question(s): (i) What is the correct interpretation of Article 31C of the Constitution after the judgment of Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980 INSC 142 ) (“Minerva Mills”)? (ii) Whether privately owned property constitutes ‘material resources of the community’ which can be acquired and distributed by the state in furtherance of Article 39(b) of the Constitution.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court by a 7-2 majority held that not all private property constitutes ‘material resources of the community’ in Articles 39(b) and (c) to be acquired and redistributed by the State. It overruled the decision of Sanjeev Coke which held that private resources also come under the material resources of the community. The judgment for the majority was written by Chief Justice Candrachud. Justice Nagarathna authored a separate partly dissenting opinion holding that all privately owned resources except for “personal effects” can constitute “material resources of the community” and private property can be “transformed” into community resources through processes such as nationalisation or acquisition. Justice Dhulia also delivered a dissenting opinion holding that income and wealth inequality are enormous and the broad interpretation of “material resources of the community” adopted in Ranganatha Reddy and Sanjiv Coke is correct. All Nine Judges held that Article 31-C continues to prevent statutes from being struck down for violating Articles 14 and 19 if they give effect to Articles 39(b) and (c), as interpreted in this judgement. The constitutionality of the MHADA will now be decided by a regular bench based on the principles laid down in this case.
STATE OF U.P. . vs M/S. LALTA PRASAD VAISH AND SONS C.A. No. 151/2007
Question(s): (i) Whether the term "intoxicating liquors" in Entry 8 of List II of the Seventh Schedule (the State List) of the Constitution of India includes ‘industrial alcohol’ within its scope. (ii) Does a state legislature possess the legislative competence to enact laws regulating ‘industrial alcohol?’
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Nine-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court by an 8:1 majority upheld a State Legislature’s power to regulate industrial alcohol and overruled the judgement in Synthetics. Chief Justice Chandrachud authored the majority opinion on behalf of Justice Roy, Justice Oka, Justice Pardiwala, Justice Misra, Justice Bhuyan, Justice Sharma and Justice Masih while Justice Nagarathna authored a dissenting opinion. The majority held that the expression “intoxicating liquors” under Entry 8 of the State List was inclusive of all kinds of alcohol which are detrimental to health. This includes denatured spirits used as raw materials to produce potable alcohol. Thus, the IDRA must be interpreted as excluding “intoxicating liquors” as interpreted in this judgment. Given the finding that industrial alcohol fell under Entry 8 of the State List, the majority held it was not necessary to decide whether orders under Section 18G of the IDRA excluded states’ power to regulate products under Entry 33 of the Concurrent List. Justice Nagarathna, in her dissenting opinion, held that ‘industrial alcohol’ is distinct from “intoxicating liquors” asserting that while States have the authority to regulate ‘intoxicating liquor’ intended for human consumption, they lack the legislative competence to legislate ‘industrial alcohol’ because of Entry 52 of List I of the Seventh Schedule (industries which the Union Government controls in the public interest) and the statutory framework of the IDRA.
IN RE SECTION 6A OF THE CITIZENSHIP ACT 1955 vs W.P.(C) No. 274/2009
Question(s): Whether Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 (“Citizenship Act”) violates Articles 11 (power to regulate citizenship), 14 (equality), 29 (protection of minority interests), 326 (right to vote), and 355 (duty of Union to protect states) of the Constitution.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: A Constitution Bench (five judges) of the Supreme Court by a majority of 4:1 upheld the constitutional validity of Section 6A. Justice Kant on behalf of himself and Justices Sundresh and Mishra authored the majority opinion and Chief Justice Chandrachud authored a separate concurring opinion. Justice Pardiwala authored a dissenting judgment declaring Section 6A invalid. In response to the contention that Section 6A was not being adequately enforced, the majority issued the following directions: The directions issued in Sarbananda Sonowal v Union of India (2005 INSC 287) should be followed to deport the illegal migrants who entered after 1971. The provisions of the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950 should be integrated with Section 6A for identifying illegal immigrants. The current statutory framework and tribunals for identifying illegal immigrants in Assam are inadequate and must be enhanced to enforce the legislative intent of Section 6A in a time-bound manner.
OMKAR vs THE UNION OF INDIA C.A. No. 10611/2024
Question(s): Should a candidate with more than 40% speech and language disability be disqualified from obtaining admission under the PwD category for the MBBS course solely based on the quantification of their disability?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: A Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, based on the report submitted by the Medical Board, granted admission to the Appellant in the MBBS course. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Viswanathan. The Supreme Court held that the role of Disability Assessment Boards is not to merely quantify the disability of a candidate but to assess whether they can pursue the course in question. In this regard, the following directions were issued: (i) Disability Assessment Boards must positively record whether the disability would impede the candidate's ability to complete the course. If the Board concludes that a candidate is ineligible, it must provide reasons for its decision; (ii) Pending the creation of an appellate body, the decisions of the Disability Assessment Boards will be subject to judicial review. The courts should refer such cases to any premier medical institute for an independent opinion and decide accordingly.
SUKANYA SHANTHA vs UNION OF INDIA W.P.(C) No. 1404/2023
Question(s): Whether provisions in the Prison Manuals of various States which distinguish between inmates based on caste are unconstitutional.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: A Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that the challenged Prison Manual provisions were unconstitutional and violated the following articles of the Constitution: Article 14 (equality), Article 15 (prohibition of caste discrimination), Article 17 (abolition of untouchability), Article 21 (life and liberty), and Article 23 (forced labour). The Court ordered the States to revise their prison manuals within three months. It also asked for a status report from the states. The judgment of the Court was authored by Chief Justice Chandrachud.
V. SENTHIL BALAJI vs THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR Crl.A. No. 4011/2024
Question(s): (i) When should constitutional courts grant bail for offences in statutes with stringent bail conditions? (ii) Whether Mr. V. Senthil Balaji (“the Appellant”) is entitled to bail.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Division Bench (two judges) of the Supreme Court granted bail to the Appellant subject to certain conditions including that he would mark his presence twice a week in the office of Deputy Director, ED in Chennai and he would surrender his passport to the PMLA Court. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Oka.
JUST RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN ALLIANCE vs S. HARISH Crl.A. No. 2161-2162/2024
Question(s): (i) Whether viewing child sexual exploitation and abuse material (“CESAM”) is punishable under Section 15 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (“POCSO Act”) and Section 67B of the Information and Technology Act, 2000 (“IT Act”). (ii) Can Section 30 of the POCSO Act (statutory presumption of culpable mental state) be invoked in a quashing petition?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Division Bench (two judges) of the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and restored the criminal proceedings against the Respondent. The Court held that the mere viewing of CESAM is punishable if no step has been taken to delete or report it. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Pardiwala.
ARVIND KEJRIWAL vs CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Crl.A. No. 3816/2024
Question(s): (i) Whether the arrest of Mr. Arvind Kejriwal by the Central Bureau of Investigation (“CBI”) while he was in judicial custody for a separate case by the Enforcement Directorate (“ED”) is legal? (ii) Whether Mr. Kejriwal is entitled to bail in the CBI case.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: A Division Bench (two judges) of the Supreme Court authored two separate opinions. Both Judges agreed that Mr. Kejriwal should be granted bail. Justice Kant held that the arrest of Mr. Kejriwal when he was in judicial custody in the ED case was not illegal. However, Justice Bhuyan found the CBI’s arrest of Mr. Kejriwal unjustified. Mr. Kejriwal’s bail was made subject to the conditions imposed on him when granting him bail in the ED Case. These conditions were that he would not visit his office or the Delhi Secretariat and he shall not sign official files unless it is required for obtaining approval of the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi.
SHAJAN SKARIA vs THE STATE OF KERALA Crl.A. No. 2622/2024
Question(s): Whether Section 18 (bar against the grant of pre-arrest bail) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (“SC and ST Act”) completely restricts the grant of anticipatory bail (pre-arrest bail) for an offence registered under the SC and ST Act.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: A Division Bench of two judges of the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and granted anticipatory bail to the Appellant. The Court held that there is no absolute restriction on granting anticipatory bail for offences registered under the SC and ST Act. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Pardiwala.
IN RE: ALLEGED RAPE AND MURDER INCIDENT OF A TRAINEE DOCTOR IN R.G. KAR MEDICAL COLLEGE AND HOSPITAL, KOLKATA AND RELATED ISSUES vs SMW(Crl) No. 2/2024
Question(s): Whether the lack of institutional safety measures for doctors and medical professionals in hospitals necessitates the intervention of the Supreme Court. If yes, what measures should the Court pass?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court set-up a nine-member National Task Force to create a national protocol for the safety of doctors and medical professionals around the country. The Task Force was required to formulate effective recommendations to address concerns pertaining to safety, working conditions and well-being of medical professionals and other cognate matters. The Task Force’s action plan may be categorized under two heads (I) Preventing violence, including gender-based violence against medical professionals; and (II) Providing an enforceable national protocol for the dignified and safe working conditions for interns, residents, senior residents, doctors, nurses and all medical professionals. The Supreme Court also ordered the CBI to submit a status report by 22 August 2024 on the progress in the investigation. The State of West Bengal was also informed to file a status report by 22 August 2024 on the progress of the investigation on the acts of vandalism which took place at the Hospital in the aftermath of the incident.
IN RE: RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF ADOLESCENTS vs SMW(C) No. 3/2023
Question(s): Whether the High Court of Calcutta was justified in using its discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution read with Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“Cr.P.C’) to set aside the appellant’s conviction for rape under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (“POCSO Act”) and the Indian Penal Code (“IPC”) on the grounds that the individuals were engaged in a romantic relationship.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Division bench (two judges) of the Supreme Court found the accused guilty of the offence of rape under Section 376(3) and 376(2)(n) of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. However, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s acquittal of the accused on the charges of kidnapping and abduction under the IPC. The judgement was authored by Justice Oka. The Supreme Court observed that consensual relationships cannot be an exception to the POCSO Act, and the High Courts cannot use their discretionary powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash prosecutions in such cases where the guilt of the accused is confirmed, even if a settlement is reached between the accused and the victim. The Supreme Court directed the State Government to constitute a committee consisting of a clinical psychologist and a social scientist to assess the victim’s situation and help her arrive at an informed decision. The Supreme Court directed the Secretaries of all States and Union Territories to ensure compliance with the POCSO Act and laws related to the welfare of minors.
MINERAL AREA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ETC. vs M/S STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA . C.A. No. 4056-4064/1999
Question(s): Should the decision in Mineral Area Development Authority v. M/S Steel Authority of India (2024 INSC 554 ) (“Mines and Minerals ”) apply prospectively (apply only to future transactions)?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court held that the Mines and Minerals decision would apply retrospectively, and the States can recover past tax dues. However, no dues could be recovered for the period before 1 April 2005. The judgment of the Court was authored by Chief Justice Chandrachud. Since Justice Nagrathna had already delivered a dissenting judgment in Mines and Minerals where she held that royalty is a tax and MMDR Act limits the taxing powers of States, she did not author an opinion.
MANISH SISODIA vs DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT Crl.A. No. 3295/2024
Question(s): Whether the Appellant, Mr. Manish Sisodia, is entitled to bail under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (“PMLA”) due to his prolonged incarceration and the delay in the conduct of his trial.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Division Bench (two judges) of the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and directed the Appellant to be released on bail. The bail was granted subject to the following conditions: (i) furnishing bail bonds for a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- with two sureties of the like amount; (ii) surrendering passport with the Special Court; (iii) regular reporting to investigation officers; and (iv) the Appellant must not attempt to influence the witnesses or tamper with the evidence. The judgement was authored by Justice Gavai.
GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI vs OFFICE OF LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR OF DELHI W.P.(C) No. 348/2023
Question(s): Whether the Lieutenant Governor (“LG”) of the National Capital Territory of Delhi (“NCTD”) is bound by the aid and advice of the elected Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (“Delhi Government”) when nominating members to the Delhi Municipal Corporation under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (“DMC Act”).
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court held that the LG is not bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers of the Delhi Government when nominating members to the MCD under Section 3(3)(b)(i) of the MCD Act. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Narasimha.
THE STATE OF PUNJAB vs DAVINDER SINGH C.A. No. 2317/2011
Question(s): (i) Whether the sub-classification of Scheduled Castes (“SCs”) for providing reservation is allowed under the Constitution of India. (ii) Whether the states have the power under Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution to sub-classify SCs.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Seven-Judge Bench, by a 6:1 majority, held that it was permissible for states to sub-classify SCs when providing reservations. Chief Justice Chandrachud authored a plurality opinion for himself and Justice Misra. Justice Gavai, Justice Mittal, Justice Nath and Justice Sharma each authored separate concurring opinions. Justice Trivedi wrote a dissenting judgment which found sub-classification to be impermissible under the Constitution.
GAURAV KUMAR vs UNION OF INDIA W.P.(C) No. 352/2023
Question(s): (i) Whether the State Bar Councils (“SBCs”) are entitled to charge enrolment fees beyond the fee prescribed by Section 24(1)(f) of the Advocates Act, 1961, when admitting law graduates to the State rolls. (ii) Whether payment of other miscellaneous fees can be made a precondition for enrolment.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Division Bench (two judges) held that SBCs cannot charge enrolment fees beyond the fees set out in Section 24(1)(f) of the Advocates Act and charging of such exorbitant fees is violative of right to equality under Article 14 and right to practise any profession under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The Court held that SBCs and Bar Council of India cannot demand additional payment of fees other than the enrolment fees and stamp duty set out in the Advocates Act. The Court pronounced its judgment with prospective effect, clarifying that SBCs are not required to refund excess enrolment fees collected from the applicants before the date of judgment. The judgment of the Court was authored by Chief Justice Chandrachud.
MINERAL AREA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ETC. vs M/S STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA . C.A. No. 4056-4064/1999
Question(s): (i) What is the scope of Entry 50 of the State List of the Seventh Schedule (the power of states to tax mineral rights subject to Parliamentary legislation)? (ii) Under Entry 54 of the Union List, what limitations can Parliament impose on the power of States to tax mining rights and mineral bearing lands? (iii) Whether charging royalty on mining leases is a form of tax. (iv) Whether the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (“MMDR Act”) limits the states’ power to tax mining rights and mineral bearing lands. (iv) Whether a state’s power to tax land under Entry 49 includes the power to tax mineral bearing land, and if yes, whether mineral produce could be used as a measure of tax.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Nine Judge Bench, by a 8:1 majority, held that royalty on mining leases can not be considered as a tax. The majority also ruled that states’ have the power to tax mining rights and mineral bearing lands under Entry 50 of List II and this power is not limited by the MMDR Act. However, Parliament has the power under Entry 54 of the Union List to limit the taxing power of the states. Chief Justice Chandrachud authored the majority judgment. Justice Nagrathna wrote a dissenting judgment which found that royalty is a form of tax, and the MMDR Act limits the taxing power of the states.
GENE CAMPAIGN . vs UNION OF INDIA W.P.(C) No. 115/2004
Question(s): (i) Whether the decision of the Union Government dated 25 October 2022 granting conditional approval for the environmental release of genetically modified Dhara Mustard Hybrid-11 (“DMH-11”) is in accordance with law. (ii) What specific guidelines should the Supreme Court lay down to ensure the safety of the approval process of hybrid transgenic mustard and other genetically modified (“GM”) crops in the future?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Division Bench (two judges) of the Supreme Court delivered a split verdict and the case was directed to be placed before a larger bench for further consideration. The Court directed the Union Government frame a National Policy on GM crops in consultation with all stakeholders including representatives from State Governments. Two separate judgments were authored by Justice Nagarathna and Justice Karol. Justice Nagarathna held that the approval granted by the Union Government for environmental release of transgenic mustard DMH-11 should be invalidated, as there was no consideration of the adverse effects of the transgenic crops on human, animal, and plant health. She directed the GEAC to submit a report on whether DMH-11 mustard is a herbicide resistant crop in consultation with all stakeholders, and to make the report public. She further directed the Union Government to ensure that the composition of the GEAC is suitably reformed in accordance with the TEC and Parliamentary Standing Committee reports. Justice Karol held that the question of ban on herbicide resistant crops is a matter of public policy and cannot be invalidated in view of precautionary principle. (This principle stipulates that in case of scientific uncertainty, appropriate actions must be taken to prevent irreversible harm to the environment.) He directed that field trials of DMH-11 shall continue strictly in accordance with the imposed safeguards. He further directed GEAC to conduct independent studies on GM organisms and upload it in its website in a timely manner. The GEAC should consider all environmental factors before granting future approvals and should endeavour to establish specifically designated farms for field testing in collaboration with the Union Government.
ARVIND KEJRIWAL V. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT 2024 INSC 512 (12 July 2024)
Question(s): (i) What legal requirements have to be satisfied for an arrest to be lawful under Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (“PMLA”)? (ii) Whether the Directorate of Enforcement’s (“ED”) arrest of Mr. Arvind Kejriwal complied with Section 19 of the PMLA.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Division Bench (Two-Judges) of the Supreme Court granted interim bail to Mr. Kejriwal while referring the legal questions concerning the validity of his arrest to a larger bench. The larger bench will address the issues related to the need and necessity for arrest under Section 19 of the PMLA. Mr. Kejriwal’s interim bail was subject to the following conditions: (i) furnishing a bail bond worth Rs.50,000 with surety; (ii) not visiting his office or signing official documents without approval; (iii) refraining from commenting on the case; and (iv) avoiding contact with witnesses or access to related official files. The judgment was authored by Justice Khanna.
MD. RAHIM ALI @ ABDUR RAHIM vs THE STATE OF ASSAM C.A. No. 7332/2024
Question(s): What is the threshold for doubting a person’s nationality under the Foreigners Act, 1946 (“Foreigners Act”)?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court found that the authorities did not possess any material to question the nationality of the Appellant. It recognised the Appellant as an Indian citizen. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Amanullah.
FRANK VITUS vs NARCOTICS CONTROL BUREAU Crl.A. No. 2814-2815/2024
Question(s): (i) Whether requiring an accused to share their location on Google Maps with the Investigating Officer, as a condition for granting bail, violates the right to privacy of the accused. (ii) Whether requiring an accused who is a foreign national to obtain a Certificate of Assurance from their High Commission/Embassy ensuring their presence in India and appearance in court can be imposed as a condition for bail.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Division bench (two-judges) of the Supreme Court noted that requiring the Appellant to drop a PIN on Google Maps does not allow for any real-time monitoring of the accused. Therefore, the condition is of no aid to the state authorities, does not further the objective of bail and thus ought to be deleted. Further, the Supreme Court held that the requirement to obtain a certificate of assurance from the High Commission was also excessive and more reasonable conditions, such as requiring the accused to surrender the passport and regularly report to the local police station or trial court can be imposed. The judgment was authored by Justice Oka.
PRABIR PURKAYASTHA vs STATE (NCT OF DELHI) Crl.A. No. 2577/2024
Question(s): (i) Whether a person arrested under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (“UAPA”) is required to be provided with the grounds of their arrest in writing. (ii) Whether the Appellant’s remand into police custody was legal.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: A Division Bench (Two Judges) of the Supreme Court held that the Appellant’s arrest and remand into police custody were invalid because the grounds for arrest were not communicated in writing before the remand. As charges had now been framed against the Appellant, the Appellant was ordered to be released from custody after furnishing bail as required by the trial court. The judgement of the Court was authored by Justice Sandeep Mehta.
ARVIND KEJRIWAL vs DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT Crl.A. No. 2493/2024
Question(s): Whether interim bail should be granted to Mr. Arvind Kejriwal?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: A Division Bench (Two-Judges) of the Supreme Court held that Mr. Kejriwal should be released on interim bail till 1 June 2024 on certain terms and conditions. First, he will have to surrender to the investigation authorities on 2 June 2024; second, he must furnish bail bonds to the sum of Rs. 50,000; third, he shall not be allowed to visit the Office of the Chief Minister and the Delhi Secretariat; fourth, he shall not sign official files unless it is required and necessary for obtaining approval of the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi; fifth, that he shall not make any comment with regard to his role in the present case; and sixth, he shall not interact with any of the witnesses or have access to any official files connected with the case.
SHARIF AHMAD vs THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH HOME DEPARTMENT SECRETARY Crl.A. No. 2357/2024
Question(s): When can a chargesheet be said to be complete so that the Court can take cognizance of the offence under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”)?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Division Bench (two judges) of the Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the Appellants and set aside the chargesheet and criminal proceedings against them. The Court held that in this case there was no evidence of entrustment; the property was not handed over in trust, rather, there was a sale. Therefore, there could be no question of a breach of trust under Section 406 IPC. Additionally, there was no material to show intent to cause alarm, necessary for an offence of criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC, even if the allegations against the Appellants were to be accepted. The Court further elaborated on the necessary contents of a chargesheet, stating that it is considered complete when it includes sufficient material and evidence for the Court to take cognizance and proceed to trial. The Court further stressed the importance of chargesheets containing detailed facts of the offence and the relevant evidence, as mandated by Section 173(2) of the CrPC.
ASSOCIATION FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORMS vs ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA W.P.(C) No. 434/2023
Question(s): (i) Whether the current use of Electronic Voting Machines (“EVMs”) ensures the integrity and security of elections. (ii) Whether there is a need for 100% vote-verification through Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (“VVPAT”) to cross-check votes cast through EVMs.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Division Bench (two judges) of the Supreme Court rejected the Petitioner’s demand for a complete return to paper ballots or for 100% counting of VVPAT slips. The Court acknowledged the Petitioner’s concerns regarding the transparency and reliability of EVMs but emphasised that the current system, which made the VVPAT slip visible to the voter for seven seconds before being deposited in a sealed box, provides an adequate method for verifying votes. The Court also issued directions to ensure further improvements in the electoral process to enhance voter confidence and the integrity of elections. Justice Khanna authored an opinion, and Justice Datta also wrote a concurring opinion.
M.K. RANJITSINH vs UNION OF INDIA W.P.(C) No. 838/2019
Question(s): (i) What steps should be taken to protect the Great Indian Bustard? (ii) Whether the order of the Supreme Court restricting overhead transmission lines over 99,000 sq km needs reconsideration. (iii) Whether a committee of experts is required for monitoring and preparing data to ensure protection for the declining Great Indian Bustard population.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, while emphasizing the critical importance of proactively protecting Great Indian Bustards, overturned the earlier interim order dated 19 April 2021. The Court held that there are no valid grounds for a blanket prohibition on solar power transmission lines across a 99,000 square kilometer area, as converting all lines to underground poses technical challenges. The judgment of the Court was authored by Chief Justice Chandrachud. Recognising the complex interplay between biodiversity conservation and climate change mitigation, the Supreme Court highlighted the need for a balanced approach.The Court constituted an expert committee, which was given a broad mandate, including assessing the feasibility of underground lines and effectiveness of bird diverters, and was directed to submit its report by July 31, 2024.
NOBLE M PAIKADA vs UNION OF INDIA C.A. No. 1628-1629/2021
Question(s): Whether Item 6 in the notification dated 28 March 2020, which granted a complete exemption from needing prior Environmental Clearance to unearth soil for creating roads, pipelines etc., was arbitrary and unconstitutional?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Division Bench (two judges) of the Supreme Court held that the decision to directly issue the 2020 Notification without holding public consultations rendered the new Item 6 unconstitutional and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees the right to live in a pollution-free environment. Further, the Supreme Court held that Item 6 of the 2020 Notification, in the absence of any specific directions, definitions and safeguards, was vague and arbitrary. The Court accordingly struck down Item 6 of the 2020 Notification. The decision of the Court was authored by Justice Oka.
NAVAS @ MULANAVAS vs STATE OF KERALA Crl.A. No. 1215/2011
Question(s): What is the suitable term of imprisonment that should be imposed for the offence of murder?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court upheld the Appellant’s conviction but reduced the sentence for the offence of murder from thirty years without remission, to twenty-five years without remission, including the period already served. The judgement of the Court was authored by Justice Viswanathan. The Supreme Court illustratively laid down the aggravating and mitigating circumstances for determining the minimum sentence (without remission) to be imposed while commuting a death sentence. In the present case, the Court held that the relatively young age of the Appellant when he committed the crime (twenty eight years), the absence of any financial motive, and no attempt to escape from the crime scene, were mitigating factors. The fact that the decision primarily relied on circumstantial evidence and the Appellant had already served more than eighteen years in jail while showcasing positive conduct throughout, further influenced the decision to reduce the sentence.
DEVU G. NAIR vs THE STATE OF KERALA Crl.A. No. 1730/2024
Question(s): Whether the Appellant’s habeas corpus petition to secure the release of her relationship-partner should be allowed?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court found no reason to doubt Ms. Nair’s report and decided not to interfere. However, the Court observed that High Courts should respect people's sexual orientation and identity without trying to undermine or alter them through therapy or other measures. The Constitution protects the rights and dignity of members of the LGBTQ+ community and courts must respect the autonomy of such individuals. The judgement of the Court was authored by Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud. The Supreme Court also established guidelines emphasising the importance of prioritising habeas corpus petitions, ensuring privacy, safety, and non-discrimination, promptly releasing detained individuals, and providing immediate police protection. These guidelines are for courts handling cases where the police or family members attempt to intervene with personal relationships that individuals have freely chosen.
JAVED AHMAD HAJAM vs THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA Crl.A. No. 886/2024
Question(s): Whether the criminal proceedings initiated against the Appellant for his WhatsApp status criticising the abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution and wishing Happy Independence Day to Pakistan should be extinguished.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court quashed the FIR registered against the appellant under Section 153-A IPC. The Court held that the right to dissent against government decisions in a legitimate and lawful manner is an integral part of the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Oka.
SITA SOREN vs UNION OF INDIA Crl.A. No. 451/2019
Question(s): Does a legislator enjoy immunity from prosecution under Article 105(2) or Article 194(2) of the Constitution of India for accepting bribes to vote in Parliament or a State Legislative Assembly?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court unanimously held that legislators are not entitled to immunity under Articles 105(2) and 194(2) of the Constitution of India for engaging in acts of bribery. This Seven Judge Bench overturned the judgment in P.V. Narasimha Rao. The Supreme Court established a dual criterion for determining when lawmakers could be granted immunity under Articles 105(2) and 194(2) of Constitution: first, immunity applied when the activity pertained to a collective function of the legislature, and secondly, the action in question must be inherently linked to the fulfilment of the duty of a legislator. The judgment was authored by Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud.
HIGH COURT BAR ASSOCIATION ALLAHABAD vs THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH Crl.A. No. 3589/2023
Question(s): (i) Can the Supreme Court of India order that all interim orders of the High Courts staying proceedings will automatically expire after a certain period? (ii) Can the Supreme Court of India direct High Courts to decide pending cases within a fixed timeframe?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Constitution Bench unanimously held that an automatic expiration of interim orders after a period of six months is impermissible. Further, the Court held that issuing blanket directions that the High Courts should hear all cases where interim stays are operating on a daily basis and decide them within a stipulated time frame was beyond the powers of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Oka, while Justice Mithal wrote a separate concurring opinion.
KULDEEP KUMAR vs U.T. CHANDIGARH C.A. No. 2874/2024
Question(s): Whether there was electoral malpractice in the conduct of elections for the post of Mayor to the Chandigarh Municipal Corporation on 30 January 2024?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court set aside the result of the election as declared by the Presiding Officer, as it found that the eight invalid votes were, in truth, valid. Invoking its extraordinary power to do justice under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court declared the Appellant, Kuldeep Kumar, as the validly elected Mayor of the Chandigarh Municipal Corporation. Furthermore, the Court directed that a show cause notice be issued to the Presiding Officer as to why proceedings under Section 340 of the Criminal Code of Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”) should not be instituted against him for making a false statement before the Court. Section 340 of the CrPC allows for a preliminary enquiry to ascertain whether any offence affecting administration of justice has been committed in respect of a document produced in court or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court. The judgment of the Court was authored by Chief Justice Chandrachud.
ASSOCIATION FOR DEMOCRATICS REFORMS vs UNION OF INDIA W.P.(C) No. 880/2017
Question(s): (i) Whether the non-disclosure of funding to political parties under the Electoral Bond Scheme violates voters’ right to information? (ii) Whether unlimited corporate funding to political parties interferes with free and fair elections and equality?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court held that the Electoral Bond Scheme, 2018 and the amendments made by the Finance Act to Section 29C of the RP Act, Section 182(3) of the Companies Act and Section 13A(b) of IT Act are unconstitutional. The Court also held the deletion of the proviso to Section 182(1) of the Companies Act permitting unlimited corporate contributions to political parties even for loss making companies is arbitrary and violative of Article 14. The judgment of the Court was authored by Chief Justice (Dr.) Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud. Justice Sanjiv Khanna wrote a concurring but separate opinion. The Supreme Court also directed that SBI shall submit to the ECI by 6 March 2024: (i) details of the Electoral Bonds purchased from 12 April 2019 till date, to the Election Commission of India (“ECI”). The details shall include the date of purchase of each Bond, the name of the purchaser and the denomination of the Bond purchased; and (ii) details of political parties which have encashed Electoral Bonds since 12 April 2019 to date to the ECI including details of each Electoral Bond encashed by political parties, the date of encashment and the denomination of the Electoral Bond. The Court directed the ECI to publish the information shared by SBI on its official website within one week from the receipt of the information (by 13 March 2024).
BILKIS YAKUB RASOOL vs UNION OF INDIA W.P.(Crl.) No. 491/2022
Question(s): (i) Whether a Writ Petition filed by the victim against the remission of convicts is maintainable under Article 32 of the Constitution? (ii) Whether public interest litigation (“PIL”) petitions can be filed against orders of remission of prisoners by the government? (iii) Whether the State of Gujarat was competent to pass the disputed orders of remission? and (iv) Whether the disputed orders of remission passed by the State of Gujarat releasing the convicted-accused (“convicted-Respondents”) were in accordance with the law?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court held that the Writ Petition filed by the Petitioner before the Supreme Court under Article 32 was maintainable. Because the Petitioner-victim’s Writ Petition was held to be maintainable, the Court did not answer the question on whether PIL petitions can be filed by other citizens to challenge remission orders. The Court found that the Government of Gujarat was not competent to pass the remission applications in favour of the convicted-Respondents. Therefore, the Supreme Court quashed the orders granting remission to the eleven convicts as illegal. The Supreme Court observed that the order in the Radheshyam Shah case directing the Government of Gujarat to consider the remission application was legally invalid because it was obtained by fraud. The judgment of the Court was unanimous and was authored by Justice Nagarathna. The eleven released convicts were directed to report back to concerned jail authorities within two weeks.
VISHAL TIWARI vs UNION OF INDIA W.P.(C) No. 162/2023
Question(s): (i) What is the scope of judicial review over the regulatory functions of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (“SEBI”)? (ii) Whether the Supreme Court should transfer the investigation into the Adani Group from SEBI to a Special Investigation Team (“SIT”).
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court held that the power of courts to interfere with the regulatory functions of SEBI is limited. The Court did not find any valid grounds to cancel the amendments made to SEBI Regulations. The Court held that there was no apparent failure in regulation by SEBI and hence there was no need to transfer the investigation to an SIT. The Court directed the Union Government and SEBI to consider the suggestions made by the expert committee to strengthen the regulatory framework. The judgment of the court was authored by Chief Justice Chandrachud.
M.K. RANJITSINH vs UNION OF INDIA W.P.(C) No. 838/2019
Question(s): (i) How should the conservation of the Great Indian Bustard (GIB) and the Lesser Florican (LF) be reconciled with green energy generation to address climate concerns?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: A Two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court largely accepted the Expert Committee's recommendations. The Supreme Court approved a revised priority area of 14,013 sq. kms for Rajasthan and 740 sq. kms for Gujarat, where stringent conservation measures will be applied and also prohibited new overhead powerlines, new wind turbines, and new solar parks/plants subject to certain exceptions, within these revised priority areas. The Supreme Court also directed the immediate rerouting and undergrounding of critical power lines, as suggested by the Committee Report, within a two-year timeframe. The judgement of the Court was authored by Justice Narasimha.
STATE OF U.P. vs AJMAL BEG ETC. Crl.A. No. 132-133/2017
Question(s): (i) Whether the ingredients of dowry death under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ("IPC") were established against the respondents. (ii) Whether the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad was justified in reversing the conviction recorded by the Trial Court in view of omissions, inconsistencies, and contradictions in the testimonies of witnesses.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The two-judge bench of the Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh. The Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and restored the judgment of conviction returned by the Trial Court against the respondent and Jamila Beg. Regarding the sentence, the Court restored the quantum of sentence for the respondent and directed him to surrender within four weeks. However, the Court refrained from incarcerating Jamila Beg, noting her advanced age of ninety-four years and associated physical frailty. The judgement of the Court was authored by Justice Karol.
DR SOHAIL MALIK vs UNION OF INDIA C.A. No. 404/2024
Question(s): i) Whether the Internal Complaints Committee (“ICC”) constituted in one department of the Central Government has the jurisdiction to entertain a complaint of sexual harassment under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (“POSH Act”) against an employee of a different department of the Central Government. (ii) Whether the use of the words ‘where the respondent is an employee’ as contained in Section 11 of the POSH Act would mandate that ICC proceedings must be instituted and carried out at the workplace of the ‘respondent’ instead of the workplace of the aggrieved woman where incident occurred and complaint was made. (iii) Under the scheme of Section 13, how is action supposed to be taken by the department of the ‘respondent’ in pursuance of the findings of the ICC constituted at the aggrieved woman’s department. (iv) Whether the proceedings of the ICC constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman have caused any prejudice to the Appellant.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the jurisdiction of the ICC constituted at the aggrieved woman’s workplace. The Court held that the phrase “where the respondent is an employee” in Section 11 cannot be interpreted to mean that proceedings may only be instituted before the ICC of the respondent’s workplace. The definition of “workplace” is wide and all-encompassing, and any restrictive interpretation would run contrary to the scheme of the POSH Act.
IN RE : ASSENT, WITHHOLDING OR RESERVATION OF BILLS BY THE GOVERNOR AND THE PRESIDENT OF INDIA vs SPL.REF. No. 1/2025
Question(s): The President of India referred fourteen questions under Article 143(1) of the Constitution of India (“the Constitution”), by reference dated 13 May 2025: Q.1. What are the constitutional options before a Governor when a Bill is presented to him under Article 200? Q.2. Is the Governor bound by the aid and advice tendered by the Council of Ministers when exercising options under Article 200? Q.3. Is the exercise of constitutional discretion by the Governor under Article 200 justiciable? Q.4. Is Article 361 an absolute bar to judicial review of the Governor’s actions under Article 200? Q.5. In the absence of a constitutionally prescribed time limit, can timelines be imposed through judicial orders for the exercise of powers under Article 200 by the Governor? Q.6. Is the exercise of constitutional discretion by the President under Article 201 justiciable? Q.7. In the absence of a constitutionally prescribed timeline, can timelines be imposed through judicial orders for the exercise of the President’s discretion under Article 201? Q.8. Is the President required to seek advice of the Supreme Court under Article 143 when the Governor reserves a Bill for the President’s assent? Q.9. Are decisions of the Governor and the President under Articles 200 and 201 justiciable at a stage anterior to the law coming into force? Is it permissible for courts to adjudicate over the contents of a Bill before it becomes law? Q.10. Can the exercise of constitutional powers and orders of the President or Governor be substituted under Article 142? Q.11. Is a law made by the State Legislature a law in force without the assent of the Governor under Article 200? Q.12. Under Article 145(3), is it mandatory for any bench to first decide whether substantial questions of constitutional interpretation are involved and refer the matter to a bench of at least five Judges? Q.13. Are the powers under Article 142 limited to procedural law, or do they extend to issuing directions contrary to existing substantive or procedural provisions? Q.14. Does the Constitution bar any jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to resolve Union-State disputes except by way of a suit under Article 131?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court rendered the following opinion on the Presidential Reference: Q.1: The Governor has three constitutional options under Article 200: to assent to the Bill, to reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President, or to withhold assent and return the Bill to the Legislature with comments. The third option is available only when the Bill is not a Money Bill. (¶165.1) Q.2: The Governor is not bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers when exercising his functions under Article 200. (¶165.2) Q.3: The discharge of the Governor’s function under Article 200 is not justiciable on the merits. However, in cases of prolonged, unexplained and indefinite inaction, the court may issue a limited mandamus directing the Governor to discharge his function within a reasonable time, without making any observations on the merits of his discretion. (¶165.3) Q.4: Article 361 is an absolute bar on personally subjecting the Governor to judicial proceedings. However, it cannot be relied upon to negate the court’s limited power of judicial review in cases of prolonged inaction by the Governor under Article 200. (¶165.4) Q.5 and Q.7: In the absence of constitutionally prescribed time limits, it is not appropriate for the court to judicially prescribe timelines for the exercise of the Governor’s powers under Article 200 or the President’s powers under Article 201. (¶¶165.5, 165.7) Q.6: The President’s exercise of discretion under Article 201 is not justiciable on the merits, for the same reasons as the Governor’s function under Article 200. (¶165.6) Q.8: The President is not required to seek advice of this Court under Article 143 each time the Governor reserves a Bill for the President’s assent. The subjective satisfaction of the President is sufficient. (¶165.8) Q.9: Decisions of the Governor and the President under Articles 200 and 201 are not justiciable prior to a Bill becoming law, and courts cannot adjudicate over the contents of a Bill before it becomes law. (¶165.9) Q.10: Exercise of constitutional powers and orders of the President or Governor cannot be substituted under Article 142 and Article 142 does not allow for the concept of “deemed assent” of Bills. (¶165.10) Q.11: No law made by the State Legislature comes into force without the Governor’s assent under Article 200. The Governor’s legislative role cannot be supplanted by another constitutional authority. (¶165.11) Q.12 and Q.14: Returned unanswered as irrelevant to the functional nature of the reference. (¶¶165.12, 165.14) Q.13: Article 142 is overly broad, and not possible to answer in a definitive manner. The scope of Article 142 in the context of the functions of the Governor and President has been addressed as part of the opinion on Q.10. (¶165.13)
MIHIR RAJESH SHAH vs THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA Crl.A. No. 2195/2025
Question(s): (i) Whether in each and every case, including those arising out of offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (“BNS 2023”), it is necessary to furnish grounds of arrest to an accused either before arrest or forthwith after arrest. (ii) Whether, even in exceptional cases where exigencies make it impossible to furnish grounds immediately, an arrest is vitiated by non-compliance with the provisions of Section 47 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS 2023”).
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The two-judge bench of the Supreme Court disposed of the appeal by clarifying that the constitutional mandate to inform an arrestee of the grounds of arrest is mandatory for all offences under all statutes. The Court held that these grounds must be communicated in writing in a language the arrestee understands. If the arresting officer is unable to communicate the grounds of arrest in writing at the time of arrest, they may be conveyed orally. However, the written grounds must be provided within a reasonable time and, in any case, at least two hours before the arrestee is produced before the Magistrate for remand. Non-compliance would render the arrest and subsequent remand illegal, entitling the person to be released. The judgement of the Court was authored by Justice Masih.
POONAM vs DULE SINGH SLP(C) No. 12000/2025
Question(s): (i) Whether the petitioner, notwithstanding her conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, was liable to be unseated from the post of Councillor when the conviction was not for a serious offence or one involving moral turpitude, but only for a minor offence. (ii) Whether an election can be set aside without specific proof that the result was materially affected by the improper acceptance of a nomination form by suppressing criminal antecedents.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: A Two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition, upholding the judgments of the Trial Court and the High Court, disqualifying the Petitioner from continuing as Councillor and declaring her election null and void. The Supreme Court declined to exercise its discretionary power under Article 136 of the Constitution as Petitioner failed to make a special or exceptional case to justify condoning her failure to disclose conviction and also noted that the Petitioner suppressed material information mandated under Rule 24-A of the Rules of 1994. The judgment of the court was authored by Justice Chandrukar.
IN RE : SUMMONING ADVOCATES WHO GIVE LEGAL OPINION OR REPRESENT PARTIES DURING INVESTIGATION OF CASES AND RELATED ISSUES vs SMW(Crl) No. 2/2025
Question(s): Two questions were referred by a coordinate Bench of two Judges of the Supreme Court: Q.1. When an individual’s association with a case is only as a lawyer advising the party, can the investigating agency, prosecuting agency or police directly summon the lawyer for questioning? Q.2. Assuming that the investigating agency has a case that the role of the individual is not merely as a lawyer but something more, should the agency be directly permitted to summon the lawyer or should judicial oversight be prescribed for such exceptional cases?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The judgment was authored by Justice Chandran. The Supreme Court answered the referred questions and issued the following directions: Q.1: The Supreme Court answered with an emphatic no. The IO, prosecuting agency, or police cannot directly summon a lawyer appearing in a case to elicit details of the case, unless the summons is grounded in one of the exceptions under Section 132 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (“BSA”), which must be explicitly stated in the summons. Additionally, the summons should specify that the lawyer so summoned may challenge it under Section 528 of the BNSS. Any such summons must also bear the prior written approval of the hierarchical superior, not below the rank of Superintendent of Police, specifying the exception relied upon (¶¶49-50). Q.2: Sufficient judicial oversight is prescribed under Section 528 of the BNSS (¶51). The constitution of a separate committee of legal professionals or enabling the summons to be issued through a Magistrate, is not warranted (¶¶44-45). Further directions issued by the Supreme Court: (a) An IO or Station House Officer shall not summon an Advocate appearing for a party to elicit details of the case unless one of the exceptions to Section 132 of the BSA applies. Any such summons must explicitly specify the factual basis of the exception, with the prior written approval of a Superior Officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police. The summons is subject to judicial review under Section 528 of the BNSS, at the instance of the Advocate or the client. The privilege applies to Advocates engaged in litigation, non-litigious or pre-litigation matters (¶67, directions 1 to 1.4). (b) Production of documents in the possession of an Advocate or client is not covered by the privilege under Section 132. In criminal cases, production shall be under Section 94 of the BNSS and Section 165 of the BSA; in civil cases, under Section 165 of the BSA and Order XVI Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court shall hear objections and decide on admissibility (¶67, directions 2 to 2.3). (c) If a direction to produce a digital device is passed by IO under Section 94 of the BNSS, it shall only be to produce before the Jurisdictional Court. The Court shall hear the party and the Advocate on any objection. If objections are overruled, the device shall be examined in the presence of the party and the Advocate, with digital expert assistance of their choice and discovery shall be confined to what the IO is entitled to seek (¶67, directions 3 to 3.3). (d) In-house counsel are not entitled to the privilege under Section 132, as they do not practise as independent Advocates. They retain the limited protection under Section 134 of the BSA (¶67, direction 4 to 4.1). The summons in SLP (Crl.) No. 9334 of 2025 was set aside (¶68).
SANJABIJ TARI vs KISHORE S.BORCAR Crl.A. No. 1755/2010
Question(s): 1. Whether a High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, can overturn concurrent factual findings of lower courts without establishing perversity. 2. Whether the presumptions of a “legally enforceable debt” under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (“NI Act”) apply when a cash loan exceeds Rs. 20,000/-, violating Section 269SS of the Income Tax Act,1961.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: A Two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s ex-parte judgment, and restored the concurrent convictions by the Trial Court and Sessions Court. The Supreme Court directed the Accused to pay Rs. 7,50,000/- in 15 equated monthly instalments of Rs. 50,000/- each. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Manmohan.
ANJUMAN ISHAAT E TALEEM TRUST vs THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA C.A. No. 1385/2025
Question(s): The Supreme Court decided the following questions arising in a consolidated batch of civil appeals filed by minority educational institutions, State education authorities, and in-service teachers: 1. Whether the State can insist that a teacher seeking appointment in a minority educational institution must qualify the Teacher Eligibility Test (“TET”), and if so, whether providing such a qualification would affect any of the rights of the minority institutions guaranteed under the Constitution of India. 2. Whether teachers appointed prior to the issuance of the National Council for Teacher Education (“NCTE”) Notification dated 29 July 2011, who have years of teaching experience, are required to qualify in the TET for being considered eligible for promotion. In the course of analysis, the Court also considered whether the Constitution Bench decision in Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust v. Union of India [(2014) 8 SCC 1], which exempted all minority educational institutions, aided or unaided, from the purview of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (“RTE Act”), warranted reconsideration by a larger bench.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The judgment was authored by Justice Dipankar Datta. On the question of the RTE Act’s applicability to minority institutions, the Court expressed doubt about the correctness of Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust and referred questions to the Chief Justice of India for consideration by a larger bench (¶¶208–210). Pending the reference and subject to the answers to the questions formulated for the larger bench, the RTE Act continues to apply to all schools as defined in Section 2(n) except those established and administered by minorities, till such time the reference is decided (¶214). Civil Appeal Nos. 1364–1367, 1385–1386, 6364, and 6365–6367 of 2025 were accordingly directed to be placed before the Chief Justice for appropriate directions (¶¶211–213). On the question of the TET’s applicability to in-service teachers of non-minority schools, the Court disposed of Civil Appeal Nos. 1389, 1390, 1391, 1393, 1395–1399, 1401, 1403, and 1404–1410 of 2025 with modifications to the impugned judgments. The TET was held mandatory for both initial appointment and promotion. Invoking Article 142, teachers having less than five years of service left as on date were permitted to continue in service without the TET qualification until superannuation, but may not be considered for promotion without it; teachers with more than five years remaining must qualify the TET within two years, failing which they shall be compulsorily retired with terminal benefits (¶¶214–219).
K. UMADEVI vs THE GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU C.A. No. 2526/2025
Question(s): Whether a woman government servant, who has two biological children from a previous marriage who are not in her custody, is entitled to maternity leave for a child born from her second marriage.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court, and declared that the appellant shall be granted maternity leave under Rule 101 (a) of the Tamil Nadu Fundamental Rules. Additionally, the Supreme Court directed that the maternity benefits admissible to the appellant shall be released to her within a period of two months from the date of the judgment. The judgement of the Court was authored by Justice Bhuyan.
ALL INDIA JUDGES ASSOCIATION vs UNION OF INDIA W.P.(C) No. 1022/1989
Question(s): (i) Should the 10% Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (“LDCE”) quota for promotion to District Judge be restored to 25%; and if so, should the minimum qualifying experience for this exam be reduced, and by how many years? (ii) Should a quota be reserved for meritorious Civil Judges (Junior Division) for promotion to Civil Judge (Senior Division) to incentivize merit within the cadre; and if so, what should be the percentage and minimum experience as a Civil Judge (Junior Division)? (iii) When calculating the quota for departmental examinations, should it be based on cadre strength or annual vacancies? (iv) Should a suitability test be introduced for promoting Civil Judges (Senior Division) to the District Judge cadre against the existing 65% quota? (v) Should the minimum practice requirement for appearing in the Civil Judge (Junior Division) examination be restored; and if so, how many years, and should this be calculated from provisional enrollment/registration or from passing the All India Bar Examination (“AIBE”)?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: A Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court restored the 25% quota for promotion of Civil Judge (Senior Division) to District Judge through the Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (LDCE), increasing it from the previous 10%. The Court also reduced the minimum qualifying experience for this promotion from five years to three years as a Civil Judge (Senior Division). The Court also fixed a quota of 10% for the meritorious Civil Judge (Junior Division) for the Promotion to Civil Judge (Senior Division) and also laid down certain parameters which the High Courts were directed to adopt while framing rules to determine the suitability test to promote Civil Judge (Senior Division) to District Judge cadre. The Court also restored the minimum practice requirement of three years for appearing in the Civil Judge (Junior Division) examination which is to be counted from the date of provisional enrollment with the concerned Bar Council of the state. The judgment of the Court was authored by the Chief Justice Gavai.
VIJAYA BANK vs PRASHANT B NARNAWARE C.A. No. 11708/2016
Question(s): (i) Whether Clause 11(k) of the appointment letter, which required a minimum service period and the payment of liquidated damages upon early resignation, amounted to a restraint of trade under Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (“ICA”). (ii) Whether the restrictive covenant was opposed to public policy under Section 23 of the ICA and violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Division Bench of the Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the appellant-bank. The Court set aside the judgment and order of the High Court. The Court held that the restrictive covenant in Clause 11(k) of the appointment letter did not constitute a restraint of trade and was not opposed to public policy. The judgement of the Court was authored by Justice Bagchi.
GAYATRI BALASAMY vs M/S ISG NOVASOFT TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED C.A. No. 6178-6179/2025
Question(s): (i) Whether the Indian Courts are jurisdictionally empowered to modify an arbitral award. (ii) Whether the power to set aside an award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 being a larger power, will include the power to modify an arbitral award and if so, to what extent. (iii) Whether an arbitral award can be modified by using Article 142 of the Constitution.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court, by a 4:1 majority, held that courts possess a limited power under Section 34 and 37 of the 1996 Act to modify an arbitral award. The majority also affirmed the courts' power to modify post-award interest where justified. Chief Justice Khanna authored the majority judgment, while Justice Viswanathan wrote a dissenting opinion, holding that courts cannot modify an arbitral award.
RUTU MIHIR PANCHAL vs UNION OF INDIA W.P.(C) No. 282/2021
Question(s): (i) Whether Sections 34(1), 47(1)(a)(i) and 58(1)(a)(i) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, which prescribe pecuniary jurisdictions on the basis of value of goods and services paid as consideration instead of compensation claimed, are constitutionally valid? (ii) Whether empowering the district, state and national commissions to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of value of the goods or services paid as consideration is violative of Article 14?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court dismissed the constitutional challenge and declared that Sections 34, 47, and 58 of the 2019 Act are constitutional. The Court held that the provisions are neither violative of Article 14 nor manifestly arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court directed the Central Consumer Protection Council and the Central Consumer Protection Authority to discharge their statutory duties by surveying and reviewing the functioning of the statute and advising the government on effective redressal measures. The judgment was authored by Justice Narasimha.
VARSHATAI vs THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA C.A. No. 5187-5188/2025
Question(s): (i) Whether the High Court of Bombay was correct in concluding that the Maharashtra Local Authorities (Official Languages) Act, 2022 does not prohibit the use of Urdu as an additional language on the signboard of a Municipal Council building in Maharashtra.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Division Bench (two judges) of the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court holding that there was no prohibition on the use of Urdu under the 2022 Act. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Dhulia.
CRYOGAS EQUIPMENT PRIVATE LIMITED vs INOX INDIA LIMITED C.A. No. 5174/2025
Question(s): (i) What are the parameters for determining whether a work or an article falls within the limitation set out in Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957, thereby classifying it as a design under Section 2(d) of the Designs Act, 2000? (ii) Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the order of the Commercial Court and thus rejecting the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC)?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the High Court’s decision to reject the application under Order VII Rule 11, holding that whether the Proprietary Engineering Drawings qualify as artistic works or designs involves a significant mixed question of law and fact that cannot be decided at a preliminary stage. The Court further directed the Commercial Court consider the issue afresh and conduct trial by applying the test laid by the court to ascertain the true nature of the Proprietary Engineering Drawings and the other related IP right infringements claimed by Inox and to decide the pending interim injunction within two months. The judgment was authored by Justice Surya Kant.
IMRAN PRATAPGADHI vs STATE OF GUJARAT Crl.A. No. 1545/2025
Question(s): Whether the recitation and posting of a poem by the appellant constituted offences punishable under Sections 196, 197, 299, 302, and 57 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), and whether registration of the FIR violated the appellant’s fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashed the FIR, and held that registration of the FIR in respect of the posted poem was a mechanical exercise without application of mind, amounted to a clear abuse of process of law, and violated the fundamental right of the appellant under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
AMIT KUMAR vs UNION OF INDIA Crl.A. No. 1425/2025
Question(s): (i) Whether recourse to inquest proceedings under Section 174 of the CrPC obviates the requirement of registration of F.I.R.?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, ruling that inquest proceedings under Section 174 are limited in scope to the apparent cause of death and cannot be used as a substitute for a full investigation into cognizable offences. The Court directed the DCP (South-West District, New Delhi) to register the First Information Report in line with the two respective complaints and depute an officer not below the rank of Assistant Commissioner of Police to undertake the investigation. Furthermore, the Court constituted a National Task Force, chaired by Justice S. Ravindra Bhat, former Judge of the Supreme Court of India, to address mental health concerns among students and to prevent suicides in higher educational institutions. Additionally, the Task Force was requested to present an interim report within four months.The Court alsodirected the Union of India to deposit an amount of Rupees Twenty Lacs (Rs 20,00,000/-) with the Registry within two weeks as an outlay for the initial operations of the Task Force.
RADHIKA AGARWAL vs UNION OF INDIA W.P.(Crl.) No. 336/2018
Question(s): The Supreme Court framed the following issues in a consolidated batch comprising writ petitions, criminal appeals, transferred cases, and a civil appeal challenging the power of arrest under the Customs Act, 1962 (“Customs Act”) and the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (“GST Act”): 1. Whether the power of arrest under Section 104 of the Customs Act and Section 69 of the GST Act is constitutionally valid and what preconditions must be satisfied before such power is exercised? 2. Whether customs officers and GST officers are “police officers” within the meaning of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872? 3. Whether the ratio in Om Prakash v. Union of India [(2011) 14 SCC 1], requiring customs officers to obtain a Magistrate’s warrant before arrest, survives the amendments to the Customs Act in 2012, 2013 and 2019? 4. Whether Sections 69 and 70 of the GST Act are constitutionally valid and whether Parliament had legislative competence under Article 246-A of the Constitution to enact arrest and penal provisions as part of the GST legislation?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court, in a judgment authored by Chief Justice Khanna (for himself and Justice Sundresh), upheld the constitutional validity of the arrest provisions under the Customs Act and the GST Act, rejected the constitutional challenges on all grounds, and laid down preconditions and procedural obligations for the exercise of the arrest power (¶77). The Court held that the ratio in Om Prakash [(2011) 14 SCC 1] was no longer applicable and drew upon the principles in Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement [(2025) 2 SCC 248] (¶22, ¶46). Justice Trivedi wrote a separate concurring opinion, agreeing with Chief Justice Khanna on when and how the power of arrest should be exercised, and additionally addressing the scope and limitations of judicial review under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution when arrest of a person is challenged (¶1, J. Trivedi).
SUNIL KUMAR SINGH vs BIHAR LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL W.P.(C) No. 530/2024
Question(s): (i) Whether the Writ Petition filed by Mr. Sunil Kumar (“Petitioner”) challenging his expulsion from the Bihar Legislative Council (“BLC”) is maintainable in view of Article 212 (1) of the Constitution of India and whether the proceedings of the Ethics Committee are amenable to judicial review. (ii) Can the Supreme Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction review the proportionality of the punishment imposed by the House? (iii) If so, whether the Petitioner’s expulsion is disproportionate to the misconduct attributed to him and whether it merits any interference? (iv) Whether the Supreme Court is empowered to determine the quantum of punishment that may be imposed on the Petitioner?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Division Bench (two judges) of the Supreme Court quashed the punishment of expulsion of the Petitioner from the BLC for being disproportionate and excessive.The Court held that the prohibition under Article 212(1) only bars Constitutional Courts from reviewing the legislative proceedings for procedural irregularity. However, it does not prevent the judicial review of the legality or constitutionality of the legislature's actions (both lawmaking and administrative decisions). The judgement of the Court was authored by Justice Kant.
SUKHDEV SINGH V. SUKHBIR KAUR 2025 INSC 197 (12 February 2025)
Question(s): 1. Whether a spouse of a marriage declared void by a competent court under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (“the 1955 Act”) is entitled to claim permanent alimony and maintenance under Section 25 of the 1955 Act? 2. Whether in a petition filed seeking a declaration under Section 11 of the 1955 Act, a spouse is entitled to seek maintenance pendente lite under Section 24 of the 1955 Act?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court answered both questions as follows: (a) A spouse whose marriage has been declared void under Section 11 of the 1955 Act is entitled to seek permanent alimony or maintenance from the other spouse by invoking Section 25 of the 1955 Act. Whether such relief can be granted depends on the facts of each case and the conduct of the parties, as the grant of relief under Section 25 is always discretionary. (b) Even if a court arrives at a prima facie conclusion that the marriage is void or voidable, pending the final disposal of the proceedings under the 1955 Act, the court is not precluded from granting maintenance pendente lite provided the conditions under Section 24 are satisfied. The grant of relief under Section 24 is also always discretionary and the Court will take into consideration the conduct of the party seeking relief. The Court directed the Registry to place the appeals before the appropriate Bench for decision on merits.
VIHAAN KUMAR V. THE STATE OF HARYANA 2025 INSC 162 (7 February 2025)
Question(s): (i) Whether the Appellant’s arrest was rendered illegal due to non-compliance with Article 22(1) of the Constitution (failure to communicate grounds of arrest). (ii) Whether the Appellant’s treatment (handcuffing and chaining to a hospital bed) violated his fundamental right to dignity under Article 21. (iii) Whether subsequent legal processes (remand, chargesheet) can validate an arrest vitiated by constitutional violations.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, declaring the Appellant’s arrest illegal due to non-compliance with Article 22(1). The Court ordered the Appellant’s immediate release, quashed all subsequent remand orders, and directed the State of Haryana to issue guidelines prohibiting the handcuffing of accused persons in hospitals. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Oka. Justice Singh authored a concurring opinion.
TANVI BEHL V. SHREY GOEL 2025 INSC 125 (29 January 2025)
Question(s): (i) Whether providing for domicile/residence-based reservation in admission to PG Medical Courses within the State Quota is constitutionally invalid and is impermissible? (ii) If such reservation is permissible, what should be the extent and manner of providing it within State Quota seats, and what should be the modality for a State/UT having only one Medical College? (iii) If such reservation is impermissible, how are the State Quota seats, other than the permissible institutional preference seats, to be filled up?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court held that providing for domicile or residence-based reservation in PG Medical Courses is constitutionally invalid and impermissible. While upholding the thirty two seats for institutional preference, the Court affirmed the High Court’s finding that the thirty two residence-based seats were wrongly filled. However, the Court ruled that students already admitted or who have completed their courses would not be affected due to the equity in their favor. The judgment was authored by Justice Dhulia.
AJAY MALIK V. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND 2025 INSC 118 (29 January 2025)
Question(s): (i) Whether the High Court acted within its powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“Cr.P.C.”) in rejecting Appellant’s quashing petition. (ii) Whether the High Court erred in rejecting the compounding application, which was moved by the appellant and supported by the complainant. (iii) Whether the High Court was legally correct in accepting the co-accused’s Criminal Revision and discharging him. (iv) Whether the existing legal framework in India sufficiently protects the rights of domestic workers.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: A Two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court’s judgment and quashing the criminal proceedings against Appellant. The Supreme Court dismissed the State’s appeal against the co-accused, upholding his discharge. Furthermore, the Supreme Court directed the Government of India to constitute a Committee comprising subject experts to formulate a legal framework for the protection and regulation of domestic workers. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Surya Kant.
RAJEEB KALITA V. UNION OF INDIA 2025 INSC 75 (15 January 2025)
Question(s): (i) Whether provision of clean and hygienic toilets in court premises is necessary to secure the right under Article 21.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: A Two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that access to proper sanitation is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution, and issued directions in the larger public interest. It directed that all High Courts and State Governments/UTs ensure the construction and availability of separate, identifiable, and accessible toilet facilities for males, females, PwD, and transgender persons across all court premises and tribunals. The Supreme Court directed the constitution of a specific committee in each High Court within six weeks to formulate a comprehensive sanitation plan. Furthermore, State Governments and UTs were directed to allocate sufficient separate funds for construction and maintenance, with a status report to be filed within four months. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Mahadevan.
RINA KUMARI @ RINA DEVI @ REENA V. DINESH KUMAR MAHTO @ DINESH KUMAR MAHATO 2025 INSC 55 (10 January 2025)
Question(s): (i) Whether non-compliance with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights by a wife would be sufficient in itself to deny her maintenance. (ii) Whether the findings in judgment of a court in a suit for restitution of conjugal rights binding on a Court deciding a petition for maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“Cr.P.C.”).
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: A Two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s judgment while restoring the Family Court’s order dated 15.02.2022. The Supreme Court ordered the Respondent to pay maintenance on or before 10th of each calendar month and the arrears of maintenance shall be paid in three instalments. The Supreme Court held that a decree for restitution of conjugal rights secured by the husband, coupled with non-compliance by the wife, would not be determinative of her right to maintenance or the applicability of the disqualification under Section 125(4) Cr.P.C. Furthermore, it was held that findings in a judgment for restitution of conjugal rights by the Family Court, being a civil court, are not binding on the court seized of a petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C.
MYPREFERRED TRANSFORMATION AND HOSPITALITY PVT. LTD. V. M/S. FARIDABAD IMPLEMENTS PVT. LTD. 2025 INSC 56 (10 January 2025)
Question(s): (i) Do the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (“Limitation Act”) apply to Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“ACA”) proceedings, and to what extent? (ii) Does Section 4 of the Limitation Act apply to Section 34(3) of ACA as per an analysis of the statutory scheme as well as precedents of this Court on the issue? If Section 4 applies, does it apply only to the 3-month limitation period or also the 30-day condonable period? (iii) In light of the answer in (ii), will Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (“GCA”) apply to Section 34(3) of ACA, and if so, in what manner?
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: A Two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of the High Court, concluding that the application under section 34 of ACA was barred by limitation. The Supreme Court held that the petition was filed beyond the condonable period of 30 days, which conclusively and absolutely expired on 28.06.2022, and Section 4 of the Limitation Act does not apply when the 30-day condonable period expires on a court holiday and Section 10 of GCA stands excluded due to application of the Limitation Act. The judgment of the court was authored by Justice Narasimha. Justice Mithal authored a concurring opinion.
URMILA DIXIT V. SUNIL SHARAN DIXIT 2025 INSC 20 (2 January 2025)
Question(s): (i) Whether a property transferred by senior citizens by gift or any other medium can be claimed back under the Section 23 of the Maintenance and Welfare of the Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (“the Act”). (ii) Whether the authorities under the Section 23 of the Act can order eviction from the property and grant the possession to the concerned senior citizens.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: A Two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Single-Judge Bench of the High Court and the authorities below and cancelled the Gift Deed because the conditions in the gift were not complied with. The Court also ruled that the authorities while exercising jurisdiction under the Section 23 of the Act can order possession to be transferred. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Karol.
IN RE: ORDER DATED 17.03.2025 PASSED BY THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD IN CRIMINAL REVISION NO. 1449/2024 AND ANCILLARY ISSUES vs SMW(Crl) No. 1/2025
Question(s): (i) Whether the accused persons have only ‘prepared’ to commit the offence of rape or moved beyond that to have ‘attempted’ to commit the said crime. (ii) Whether guidelines are required for inculcating sensitivity and compassion into judicial approach while dealing with matters involving sexual offences.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: A Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court allowed the Criminal Appeals, setting aside the impugned judgment of the High Court dated 17.03.2025. The Court restored the original summons order passed by the Special Judge (POCSO), Kasganj. The Supreme Court also requested the National Judicial Academy, Bhopal to constitute a five-member Committee of Experts, to prepare a comprehensive report on the matter of ‘Developing Guidelines to Inculcate Sensitivity and Compassion into Judges and Judicial Processes in the Context of Sexual Offences and other Vulnerable Cases’. Accordingly, the suo motu case was disposed of with various directions. The judgment of the Court was authored by Chief Justice Surya Kant.
THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER vs M/S S.V. GLOBAL MILL LIMITED C.A. No. 909-910/2026
Question(s): The Supreme Court decided the following questions in a consolidated batch of civil appeals filed against High Court judgments dismissing their first appeals under Section 74 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (“2013 Act”) as barred by limitation: 1. Whether, in cases where land acquisition proceedings were initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (“1894 Act”) but the award was passed after the commencement of the 2013 Act, Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act governs such proceedings and the first appeal is maintainable under Section 74 of the 2013 Act rather than Section 54 of the 1894 Act. 2. Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (“1963 Act”), providing for condonation of delay on satisfaction of sufficient cause, applies to first appeals preferred before the High Court under Section 74 of the 2013 Act, having regard to Section 103 of the 2013 Act and Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decision of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court allowed all the appeals. The judgment was authored by Justice M.M. Sundresh. On the incidental question, the Court held that Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act applies to all cases where awards are passed after the commencement of the 2013 Act, and that first appeals from such awards are governed by Section 74 of the 2013 Act, not Section 54 of the 1894 Act (¶97(i)–(iii)). On the primary question, the Court held that Section 74 does not bar the application of Section 5 of the 1963 Act (¶97(iv)). Noting that the delays were largely not substantial and that remitting matters would prolong litigation, the Court itself allowed all applications for condonation of delay and set aside the impugned judgments on the limitation issue (¶82–83). State Governments were directed to issue appropriate directions to officers dealing with Section 74 appeals, and High Courts were directed to adopt a pragmatic rather than a pedantic approach in dealing with applications for condonation of delay (¶97(vii)–(viii)).
